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ABSTRACT: This paper looks at the role of individuals and the strategies that they use to bring about or oppose 
major policy change. Current analysis of the role that individuals or small collectives play in periods of major policy 
change has focussed on strategies that reinforce change and on the supporters of change. This paper adds the 
perspective of opponents, and asks whether they use similar strategies as those identified for supporters. Five 
strategies are explored: developing new ideas, building coalitions to sell ideas, using windows of opportunity, 
playing multiple venues and orchestrating networks. Using empirical evidence from Dutch and Hungarian water 
policy change, we discuss whether individuals pursued these strategies to support or oppose major policy change. 
Our analysis showed the significance of recognition of a new policy concept at an abstract level by responsible 
government actors, as well as their engagement with a credible regional coalition that can contextualise and 
advocate the concept regionally. The strategies of supporters were also used by opponents of water policy 
change. Opposition was inherent to policy change, and whether or not government actors sought to engage with 
opponents influenced the realisation of water policy change. 
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"(…) we are open to any idea, whether it comes from a Democrat or a Republican 
or a vegetarian". 
Barack Obama, February 10th 2009 
INTRODUCTION 
During the last two decades, the water policy in the Netherlands and Hungary, two flat and low-lying 
countries in Europe, underwent major change. Having relied on flood levees, river normalisation and 
drainage for over two centuries, water retention and floodplain rehabilitation were introduced to 
replace or complement prevailing water management practices. Whereas the substance and 
organisational aspects of water management in these countries are well documented, much less is 
known about the dynamics and path of the policy change itself. This paper seeks to improve our 
understanding of how periods of major water policy change unfold. We frame major policy change as a 
policy transition1 (cf. Huitema and Meijerink, 2009) and build on results from transition literature. 
                                                          
1
 How to distinguish transitions from shallow levels of change is contested. Here we follow Huitema and Meijerink (2009), who 
postulate that policy transitions should become visible in a reorientation of the substance of policies (e.g. from flood levees to 
water retention) or the governance paradigm (e.g. from state control to privatisation). A transition consists of both changing 
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To analyse and interpret the dynamics of fundamental change, transition management frameworks 
have been developed that describe the different stages and processes of transitions (Rotmans et al., 
2005) and transition pathways (Geels and Schot, 2007). Research has attempted to uncover the process 
dynamics which can lead to a transition’s success or failure (Olsson et al., 2006). One new development 
is to look at governance and agency. For example, Kemp et al. (1998) and Smith (2003) studied 
incumbent actors and (niche) pioneers. In addition, Schot and Geels (2007) aimed to provide insight 
into how actors create, nurture and sustain niches that can drive a transition. Huitema and Meijerink 
(2009) analysed strategies employed by individuals and small collectives during a transition, going 
beyond pioneers and recognising a broader set of roles that actors can fulfil. So far, the emphasis in the 
research on transition dynamics has been on how a transition is reinforced and on transition supporters 
(Rotmans et al., 2005; Van der Brugge and Rotmans, 2007). In transition literature, the opposition is 
typically described as a group that 'has to be persuaded' or 'aligned'; opponents are rarely studied as 
actors in their own right. The influence of opponents on the direction of a transition, and the strategies 
that they use remain largely unexplored. This is all the more surprising as, for example, Loorbach (2007) 
recognised that transitions go against existing assumptions and worldviews, and that a transition may 
need certain elements of dissent, conflict and difference of opinion to facilitate innovation, competition 
and learning. 
To add to the debate on the role of individuals and groups of individuals in the unfolding of major 
policy change, we narrow our analysis to individuals (both supporters and opponents of water policy 
change) and compare the strategies that they used in two case studies: the Hungarian Tisza river and 
the Ooij polder in the Netherlands. The cases have been selected to represent a so-called "most 
different cases design" in Europe. That is, the cases have been selected to minimise the difference in 
the type of water management activities under discussion, yet maximise the difference between 
historical and institutional contextual factors. In the face of these contextual differences, this case 
design allows for ground to suggest that similarities found between the cases are robust elsewhere. 
The cases have in common that water policy was reoriented towards measures to create space for 
rivers, water retention and emergency storage reservoirs. This reorientation to non-structural and land 
use-related water management activities has been observed since the 1980s in countries around the 
world (e.g. Fokkens, 2001; Kundzewicz, 2002; Huitema and Meijerink, 2009; Molle et al., 2009), adding 
to the relevance of the cases. In both case studies this reorientation was confirmed by national policy, 
yet implementation slowed down or was abandoned altogether. Here too, the cases are not unique, as, 
for example, Rhodius (2008) and Hartmann (2010) noted opposition to the introduction of controlled 
flood storage in Germany, while in Britain a 'green river bypass' to make space for the river Thames 
raised controversy. 
The cases differ in terms of the historical and institutional context and the governance traditions 
upon which water management has developed. In Hungary, the Hungarian government, under the 
Austro-Hungarian Empire, started major drainage and river normalisation projects in the Tisza Basin, 
which continued during the communist era after the Second World War. Over the last two decades, 
Hungary has changed from a communist state to a post-communist democracy and European Union (EU) 
member, where remnants of previous economic and political orders still shape expectations and 
patterns of conduct (Pérez-Solórzano Borragán, 2005). The Netherlands, on the other hand, has been a 
constitutional monarchy since 1815 and a parliamentary democracy since 1848. It has an open 
economy, relying largely on international trade, and is one of the founding members of the EU. Water 
management and its institutions have evolved over several hundred years from private initiatives 
building dikes and reclaiming land to a governance regime with well-recognised national and regional 
responsibilities. 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
policy on paper and implementing change on the ground. The more fundamental the change in policy and its implementation, 
the more it resembles what we call a transition. 
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The analysis in this paper consists of three parts. First, we examine our two case regions from an 
empirical perspective, based on interviews, a literature review and stakeholder workshops. We discuss 
the role of individuals during the attempt to change policy and in the following years when actors had 
to deliver on the new direction taken in water policy. After these chronological case descriptions, we 
elaborate on the interaction of supporters and opponents in the discussion section. In particular, the 
research is synthesised to discuss the fivefold distinction of strategies of individuals in Huitema and 
Meijerink (2009): 
1. Developing new ideas (cf. Hajer, 1995; Baumgartner and Jones, 2002; Van der Brugge et al., 
2005), 
2. Building coalitions2 for selling ideas (cf. Sabatier, 1988; Folke et al., 2005; Olsson et al., 2006), 
3. Recognising and exploiting windows of opportunity3 (cf. Kingdon, 1995), 
4. Using multiple venues4 (cf. Baumgartner and Jones, 2002), and 
5. Orchestrating networks (cf. Folke et al., 2005; Caniëls and Romijn, 2008). 
The paper closes with conclusions and recommendations for future research into the role of individuals 
in furthering or blocking water policy transitions. 
Our case studies suggested that opposition is an inevitable element of major policy change. The 
influence of individuals on policy change became particularly prominent in the interaction between 
supporters and opponents of (parts of) a transition, while engaging with or managing opponents was a 
strategy that individuals used to advance the transition. A special role was that of translating the idea of 
the transition to other actors. In the cases we analysed, the influential coalitions had an individual that 
took this role at their base. Whether or not government actors sought to involve these individuals in 
policy making influenced the realisation of the transition. In the Dutch case, where this was omitted, 
the coalition obstructed the transition. By engaging with opponents, negotiated solutions could give the 
transition a new impetus, yet at the same time steer away from the original idea, alienating supporters. 
Successful strategies to discredit the transition included: challenging the legitimacy of (assumptions 
underlying the) new approach, engaging with experts from the supporters’ research community and 
changing budget priorities. 
WATER POLICY CHANGE IN HUNGARY AND THE NETHERLANDS 
In order to analyse the strategies of supporters and opponents of water policy change, this section 
chronologically describes attempted transitions in Hungarian and Dutch water policy. The narrative is 
based on information from interviews and workshops with regional and national stakeholders and 
analysis of documents on the new water policies and related project plans. In the Netherlands, sixteen 
non-directive interviews were conducted with key players, mainly in 2005 and 2006, and a public 
information meeting of the then operational water policy commission was attended. This information 
was complemented by documentary analysis, including draft and internal documents. In Hungary, data 
were collected in three ways: through twenty-one semi-structured interviews with actors from national 
and regional organisations (ministries, water authorities, planners, academic institutions, non-
governmental organisations (NGOs), municipalities and farmers), a series of group discussions with local 
and national stakeholders and by analysis of policy and planning documents and background studies. 
                                                          
2
 Coalition building emphasises shared beliefs and explicit agreements on how to pool and use resources to achieve common 
goals. 
3
 A 'window of opportunity' opens when three issue streams align: 1) problem stream (issue on the public agenda), 2) political 
stream (on the political agenda) and 3) policy stream (attention for official policy options). 
4
 We understand venues as the possible places where policy issues can be debated. Typical venues include levels of 
government, media and research forums. 
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River Tisza policy, Hungary 
The Tisza river is the largest tributary of the Danube, receiving water from the Carpathian Mountains in 
Romania, Slovakia and Ukraine before running through Hungary and meeting the Danube in Serbia. 
Almost fifty per cent of Hungary is located in the Tisza basin. Until the 18th century, river management 
was mainly organised around the operation of a system of small structures and channels that regulated 
the water flow between the main riverbed and the floodplain (Balogh, 2002). The inundation frequency 
determined land use, giving rise to a patchwork of plough land, forest, floodplain orchards, meadows, 
fish ponds and grazing areas (Bellon, 2004). From the 1750s, the Tisza river was heavily modified, with 
major changes introduced by the Hungarian government under the Austro-Hungarian Empire in the 
19th century. Dike building, regulation of one-third of the river’s length and floodplain drainage 
decreased the total naturally flooded area by 84 per cent (figure 1). The communist era after the 
Second World War supported large-scale intensive agriculture in the region. Water management was 
controlled by a powerful water bureaucracy that was well expanded socially (through prestige attached 
to engineering profession), politically (with close relationships between both local and national 
politicians, state bureaucrats and planners), informationally (state support for research) and 
economically (due to large budgets and proximity with construction and consulting firms). Privatisation 
at the beginning of the 1990s led to a drop in the operation and maintenance of the large irrigation 
systems and of agricultural output. Scientists increasingly associated the prevailing water management 
of river regulation and drainage with problems such as increased flood risk, inland drought, water 
stagnation, soil salinisation, the degradation of peat lands and wetlands and the loss of the traditional 
water management system and related production systems (Barta et al., 2000; Vámosi, 2002; Bellon, 
2004). At present, the Tisza region is socio-economically challenged by a high unemployment rate, 
ageing and migration (Sendzimir et al., 2004; Linnerooth-Bayer et al., 2006). Large areas have an 
unclear property status and unresolved responsibility for water system maintenance and taxation 
(Matczak et al., 2008). On a more upbeat note, the region has great potential for recreation and nature 
conservation (Vári et al., 2003). 
After twenty years of drought, annual floods returned from 1998. The floods acted as a driving force 
behind the development of a new water policy for the Tisza river, in Hungary known as the New 
Vásárhelyi Plan. Below, we describe chronologically the development of water policy and the activities 
of supporters and opponents in the last decade. Figure 3, at the end of this section, summarises the 
actions of key individuals. 
Recurring major floods and the cyanide spill on the Tisza river in 2000 backed the strategy of local 
NGOs to define the prevailing water management as unsustainable and requiring a different approach. 
At the time, the consensus amongst scientists grew that raising dikes was no longer efficient from an 
economical perspective and was likely to increase flood levels (Glatz, 2003). This consensus proved 
instrumental in opening up the debate about an alternative water policy. The abstract notions of water 
retention, floodplain rehabilitation and integrated river basin management already had supporters in 
the national government and major NGOs, such as the WWF, as well as abroad (Váradi, 2003). This was 
at least partly so because European directives advocated such approaches and the European Union 
offered indispensable financial support (e.g. the pre-accession funds; see McGuinn, 2003) as well as 
pressure to take cropland out of production (Gere, 2007). 
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Figure 2. a) Hungarian Tisza river basin; b) oxbow lake: traditional water management used oxbows and 
creeks for water regulation; and c) construction of water infrastructure in the first retention 
reservoir (Photos: Werners). 
 
A group of civil servants and scientists developed a first version of the new water policy in consultation 
with the WWF. Its innovation was the introduction of water retention in built reservoirs5 and the 
widening of riverbanks. Built retention areas had supporters among water engineers as an alternative 
to raising dikes (Szlávik, 2001; Somlyódy, 2002; Váradi, 2003). An early supporter in the context of the 
development of the new water policy was the head of department at the Water Resources Research 
Center VITUKI (Szlávik, 2001a; Szlávik, 2001b). Although the policy’s main aim was flood protection, it 
allowed for 'nature development' in accordance with the European Water Framework Directive and 
environmental regulations (Bálint et al., 2000; KöViM, 2002). To achieve the target flood level reduction, 
and to keep reservoir size and depth manageable, the Ministry of Transport and Water Management 
presented a series of fourteen potential sites. Little attention was paid to affected parties: "We will 
propose to enlarge the flood banks and make other corrections, but it will be the task of politicians to 
make people accept it and ensure compensation for them wherever homes would have to be moved", 
said Lajos Kovacs, chief advisor at the Ministry of Transport and Water Management (Fenyo, 2001). 
Opposition grew and local parties refused to take part in the implementation (Gere, 2007). 
Implementation of the policy required local support and a concrete example of the application of 
the proposed (abstract) principles to the regional situation. A new coalition of twelve municipalities in 
the Tisza region, three non-profit organisations6 and researchers, known collectively as Bokartisz, 
offered both. Bokartisz opposed the government’s version of the water policy, but offered to cooperate 
with the national planning bodies to implement water retention, on condition that its own concept of 
floodplain rehabilitation and shallow flooding would be considered and tested (alongside the 
                                                          
5
 Reservoirs created by building a ring dike in the floodplain next to the river with a floodgate for letting in water during high 
water events and an outlet to return water to the river. 
6
 The E-misszió Environmental Association, the Hungarian Environmental Economy Centre, and the Palocsa Association. 
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government’s plan). Bokartisz’ leader, Géza Molnár, had studied the floodplain management system in 
the Tisza valley from old documents (Andrásfalvy, 1973; Bellon, 1991). Together with a group of farmers 
and landowners he had restored and experimented with traditional water steering systems on a small 
scale at various locations along the Tisza since the 1980s. Based on these experiments, the founders of 
the Bokartisz coalition developed their concept of integrated floodplain management and floodplain 
rehabilitation, aiming to recreate a mosaic landscape structure and regular shallow flooding for 
sustainable rural development. Coalition members began advocating their concept under the name 
'Last Straw' in 2001 (Botos et al., 2002). The main difference with the government plans and Bokartisz’ 
concepts was that the former proposed to build retention reservoirs to be used during extreme floods, 
whereas the latter focused on rural development and revitalisation of the floodplain through annual 
shallow flooding, making use of natural landscape elements. It is important to stress that Bokartisz did 
not present floodplain rehabilitation as something new, but rather referred back to floodplain 
utilisation before river regulation. Researchers at the Hungarian Academy of Science and the national 
Water Resources Research Centre lent authority to the ideas Bokartisz promoted. 
The 2001 flood and dike break highlighted the problem. The 2002 national elections brought to 
power a new coalition determined to prove itself different from the previous government. Water affairs 
were transferred to a new Ministry of Environment and Water, setting the scene for a change in 
procedures. The then upcoming accession to the European Union favoured a shift towards participatory 
and integral planning. In this way, 2002 brought convergence of the issue streams, opening a window of 
opportunity (Kingdon, 1995) for coupling a new policy idea, a relevant problem and political will. The 
key player to use this window came in the shape of the Head of Department entrusted with the 
development of the plan at the new Ministry of Environment and Water, Dr. Váradi. He swiftly took the 
lead in strategy to ensure advancement of the new water policy, taking the strategic alliance of the 
water authority,7 its engineers and contractors by surprise. A government decree was passed in 
February 2003 that acknowledged the concept of floodplain rehabilitation and rural development and 
created two new venues for the further development of the water policy: a new inter-ministerial 
committee and a series of tenders to deliver support studies and a regional implementation plan. 
The Bodrogköz area, which had not been one of the fourteen areas the national government had 
identified in the draft version of the built reservoirs plan, was added, as Bokartisz had suggested this 
territory for water retention (KöViM, 2002; Váradi, 2003). Bokartisz was active in the Bodrogköz area, 
where support from the water board and mayors inside and outside the Bokartisz coalition was high 
and opposition minimal. A planner for the national planning agency VÁTI successfully managed the 
network of research partners, NGOs and local representatives. Respecting regional representation and 
experience as well as national competencies, VÁTI used the tenders for policy development work to 
support a new interdisciplinary community in the creation of a body of evidence on floodplain 
rehabilitation in the Tisza region. In close cooperation with the inter-ministerial committee, VÁTI 
delivered the spatial plan for implementing the water policy, combining water retention in 
multifunctional reservoirs, floodplain revitalisation and rural development. 
In the development of water policy for the Tisza, we observe a significant change in the substance of 
the policy and in the procedure applied in its design. The water policy endorsed in 2003 explicitly 
recognised rural development and nature conservation as important objectives alongside flood 
protection. Floodplain rehabilitation, retention areas and land-use change were introduced in parallel 
to replace or complement flood levees that had been the preferred solution in water management for 
150 years. Government documents and actors involved talk about a paradigm shift or change in 
philosophy. Figure 2 illustrates the main policy ideas in Tisza water management. 
                                                          
7
 The National Water Authority (OVF) of Hungary implements water management under the control and supervision of the 
Ministry of Environment and Water Management. The regional water authorities (also called water boards) perform their 
duties under the control of the OVF. 
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Figure 2. Schematic overview of main ideas in the transition. 
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With the October 2003 government decree and the 2004 Tisza Law, the national government endorsed 
the implementation of the policy. Endorsement notwithstanding, since then only two of the first six 
retention reservoirs have been built, while the related floodplain rehabilitation and rural development 
have either not been attained or attained only after many delays. In 2005, a survey undertaken by the 
State Audit Office of Hungary confirmed that flood protection was favoured over rural development 
objectives in the implementation (Kovácz, 2005). Actors identified different reasons for the delays, 
including problems with land acquisition and the fragmentation of responsibilities and funding. 
Divergence in the objectives and mandates of institutions, as well as the complexity of national and 
European financial flows, slowed down the implementation of cross-sectoral initiatives (Werners et al., 
2009). The network of civil servants, experts and regional representatives that prepared the 
implementation plan fell apart, and high-ranking civil servants that had engaged with the regional 
coalition resigned after budget cuts; their replacements never gained the same visibility and respect in 
the region. 
Furthermore, cooperation between the Ministry of Environment and Water and the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Rural Development decreased. The Ministry of Environment and Water used available 
funds to move ahead with flood protection (Cselószki, 2006), not delivering on agri-environmental 
payments for affected farmers, which required support from the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural 
Development. It was suggested that, under pressure from large landowners, the Ministry of Agriculture 
favoured using European agricultural funds for direct agricultural output-based support rather than for 
agri-environmental schemes. As a central member of the Bokartisz coalition and Tisza Alliance put it: 8 
In November 2003 it seemed that all parties were on the best way to make an integral implementation 
plan for the Vásárhelyi plan. (…) As I see it now, the water engineers did not change their opinion. Their 
goal was still only flood protection. They just said: "if the farmers want floodplain management and land 
use change, we shall give them the opportunity and support (…)". In a way, Váradi and Szlávik were 
pioneers in the water engineering field because they let new ideas come into the planning. (…) when they 
resigned the old school, water engineers came back into force. 
The venues created for the development of the plan were not maintained. The inter-ministerial 
committee – the main coordination body of water policy – had neither an official legal position nor the 
mandate to allocate money for implementation. From the middle of 2004, the dialogue between 
regional and national parties declined, as did the frequency of the inter-ministerial committee sessions. 
Consequently, the transparency of the planning process declined and, for example, in the Bodrogköz 
area, the information flow to stakeholders and their consultation practically stopped (Cselószki, 2006). 
                                                          
8
 Interview: 29 August 2007, Budapest. 
Water Alternatives - 2010  Volume 3 | Issue 1 
Werners et al.: Water policy change in the Netherlands and Hungary Page | 33 
Application for EU support caused additional delays: the government decided to postpone reservoir 
building in 2005 to be able to apply for European funds in support of the implementation (Visnovitz, 
2008). A new venue was explored when farmers went to court over perceived fraud in the 
expropriation; as one of the involved farmers expressed: 9 "the whole expropriation is sensitive, 
because for a highway they *the government+ pay much more. And we don’t even get a highway, we 
only get a reservoir". 
Another sign of the deteriorating communication was that the interpretation of the policy idea of 
floodplain management started to diverge between actors during implementation. Key individuals in 
the water authority and the national water research institute began to question whether shallow 
flooding and floodplain revitalisation could attain the same flood protection levels as dry polders, and 
pressed for putting flood defence above the protection of natural values (Visnovitz, 2007). A floodplain 
management pilot area, managed by a key member of the Bokartisz coalition, was excluded from the 
water policy’s implementation plan by the Ministry and Environment and Water, which contested the 
area’s contribution to water level reduction during extreme floods (Visnovitz, 2007). Local mayors in the 
Bodrogköz area questioned whether the negotiations and expropriation were conducted in their best 
interest and started to express discomfort with the negotiated concept of floodplain management.10 As 
more and more of the water management ideas of the Bokartisz coalition were given up or delayed at 
the implementation stage, Bokartisz’ leader withdrew from active coordination. Key members started a 
new coalition – the Living Tisza Alliance – to pursue the objectives of floodplain revitalisation and 
sustainable rural development in another area close by. 
By 2005, the 2003 window of opportunity for changing the water policy had closed. There had not 
been a major flood for some time and political priorities had changed. The main policy ideas were 
challenged. The concept of floodplain management, rural development and nature protection 
disappeared from government publications and the language of the concerned department in favour of 
floodwater retention and improvement of flood infrastructure (e.g. Visnovitz, 2008; 
www.vizugy.hu/vtt/sajtoanyag.html#37). The Living Tisza Alliance tried to use the 2006 elections to 
generate new momentum for the integral implementation of the water policy by soliciting support from 
potential coalition parties and initiating a memorandum to Ministers and political parties, which was 
signed by 120 concerned local governments, smallholders, civil organisations and researchers (Kajner, 
2006). Although party representatives expressed their support, there was little effect on the 
implementation of the policy. 
By 2009 two reservoirs had been built and negotiations at other locations continued. The 
implementation of the water policy illustrated that support – as well as opposition – had to be gained 
and maintained. Water policy planners, as well as politicians, witnessed that local leaders, farmers and 
residents of concerned settlements consistently laid down conditions for the acceptance of retention 
reservoirs, such as infrastructural investments, one-off compensation or warranted agri-environmental 
payments (Cselószki, 2006). 
Figure 3 summarises the chronological narrative above, highlighting the actions of central individuals 
on which the discussion section builds. The figure focuses on the actions of and interaction between the 
network of the national water authority and the regional coalition Bokartisz. 
                                                          
9
 Interview: 22 August 2007, Nagyrozvágy/Bodrogköz region. 
10
 Interview: 23 August 2007, Cígand. 
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Figure 3. Main actions and interactions between central actors in the network of the national water 
authority and the regional coalition Bokartisz in Hungary. 
Time / context Actions of individuals in the 
network of water authority, water 
engineers (National) 
Policy interaction Actions of individuals in the regional 
coalition of municipalities, NGOs & 
scientists (Bokartisz) 
1990s Floods 
recurring. EU and 
NGOs promote 
'living with water' 
A few water experts challenge dike 
reinforcement and engage with national 
nature protection NGOs 
 Individuals carry out pilot studies on floodplain 
revitalisation and build a network of regional 
farmers, civil organisations and experts 
2000 Flood and 
cyanide spill; 
EU accession 
negotiation 
Develop new water policy: water retention 
in built reservoirs and widened riverbanks 
possibly combined with nature conservation 
 Led by Geza Molnár, municipalities and regional 
NGOs create regional coalition Bokartisz to 
promote floodplain revitalisation. The leader of 
Bokartisz invites the responsible government actor 
to present policy plans. 
2001 Dike break Present policy plans in the region. 
Try to secure funding (including EU 
pre-accession funds) 
Ideas conflict. 
Objectives differ 
NGO members in Bokartisz organise 
opposition in the region using media as a 
venue 
2002 Responsible government actor 
invites Bokartisz 
Discuss mutual ideas Researchers in Bokartisz strengthen 
cooperation with (inter-)national partners 
2003 Elections & 
new coalition 
government. 
Ministries and 
water authority 
reorganised 
Responsible government actor 
uses window of opportunity for 
government approval of new 
policy ideas and to create new 
venues: inter-ministerial 
committee and five open tenders 
for background research. 
Intense cooperation; 
shared idea: 
Water retention in 
multifunctional 
reservoirs. Shallow 
flooding in floodplain 
on demand regions 
Mayors in Bokartisz coalition 
conditionally offer territory. Researchers 
in Bokartisz coalition secure Bokartisz’ 
position in national water policy tenders 
and international projects 
2004 
EU accession 
Key civil servants resign after budget cuts  NGOs train farmers (e.g. in applying for agri-
environmental schemes) 
 Start implementation. Cease inter-
ministerial panel and interpersonal 
cooperation with region 
 Mayors protest in Budapest against limited 
information and lacking funds for, amongst others, 
land-use change 
2006 Reduce regional project bureau; 
postpone implementation to apply for EU 
funds 
 NGO leaders start new coalition with supporters of 
floodplain management and develop plan for 
alternative region. 
  Occasional 
workshops 
NGOs cooperate in Europe-funded projects 
outside area water policy. 
2008 Water Ministry starts national media 
campaign, highlighting technical aspects 
 Conditionally offer alternative region for 
implementation water policy. 
Press releases scorn media campaign 
Flood policy, the Netherlands 
Located in the delta of four European rivers – the Rhine, the Meuse, the Scheldt and the Ems – the 
Netherlands is crucially dependent on water management and effective flood protection. Water policy 
change in the Netherlands started with the new concept of 'nature creation', or green engineering. It 
emerged when, in the 1980s, a group of ecologically-minded, mid-ranking bureaucrats from the 
Ministry of Agriculture and from the Public Works Department (Rijkswaterstaat) got together with the 
Dutch branch of the World Wildlife Fund to come up with new ideas for countryside planning (Warner, 
2003).11 The discourse on green engineering developed out of many social interactions and cannot be 
attributed to anyone exclusively. However, successful discursive entrepreneurs can exploit the 
ambiguities of a discourse to promote their legitimacy (Van Hemert, 1999). The late 1980s were a 
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 The Dutch government organised the so-called Eo Wijers contest to elicit innovative policy ideas in town and country 
planning. The prize-winning project proposed bringing back the stork into the Dutch countryside by 'developing' natural values. 
Nature development seeks to increase the diversity and abundance of natural values through green engineering. 
(www.ecoplan.nl/inhoud/natuurontwikkeling/natuurontwikkeling.htm) 
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propitious time for green engineering. The once unassailable Public Works Department suffered 
legitimacy defeats after successful public protests against dike reinforcements that sought to preserve 
the environment and cultural landscape. The Department wanted to rid itself of its technocratic, 
solipsistic image. It also needed a new problem to solve and programme of work after the completion 
of the coastal protection works (Van Hemert, 1999). In addition, recurring agricultural surpluses 
(produce and manure) had made farming unpopular. Agricultural retrenchment through buyout would 
free up space for the river to meander and for more natural banks. Green engineering seemed to tie in 
well with the environmental consciousness peaking at the turn of the 1990s. Nature organisations such 
as the World Wildlife Fund, sceptical at first, bought into the concept with their Living Rivers publication 
(WWF, 1992), which introduced the idea of river bypasses to restore ecosystems. 
The Public Works Department, spatial planners and the Ministry of Agriculture (now incorporating a 
nature branch) initiated landscape designs for the Border Meuse, and proposed restoration 
interventions for the Rhine where it enters Dutch territory. The green engineering plans, however, 
suffered a setback when the Rhine and Meuse came close to overflowing in 1993 and 1995. Protection 
became the first priority and supporters of flood levees were quick to rush a crash programme of 
revetments through Parliament. These supporters were often engineers who were formerly involved in 
the major coastal protection works and who were sceptical about climate change, sea level rise and 
about spending public money on non-security issues. They contested the often-heard claim that dikes 
could no longer guarantee safety and needed to be supplemented with river-widening interventions. 
They felt 'security' as a prime objective was watered down by the alliances of water managers and 
environmental conservationists. 
Nevertheless, the green wave persisted among top officials in the Public Works Department. Their 
solution was to create 'Room for the River' with measures such as dike setbacks, widening and lowering 
the floodplain, and creating more natural river banks with less steep gradients. An important 
consequence of the high water periods was a growing awareness of the flipside of security provided by 
taming the rivers through dikes. Water experts from the national research institute RIZA and WL Delft 
Hydraulics, who also advised on water policy, started to research non-traditional insecurity elements, 
ranging from human factors in dike failure to climate change. This led to the public communication of a 
new message on flood security from the Public Works Department: dikes cannot guarantee total 
security and there will always be 'residual risk'. The question, then, became: How do we deal with the 
residual risk? A senior civil servant at the Public Works Department, Van den Hoek, advocated making a 
structural reservation for water retention, or 'calamity polders'.12 The research institute Delft Hydraulics 
gave this idea technical and intellectual legitimacy by stressing that flooding land to save other areas 
had historic precedents. The Vice-Minister for Water13 strongly welcomed the idea of retention areas. A 
window of opportunity for aligning green (nature), blue (water) and red (socio-economic) values 
opened when the Vice-Minister for Water got along well personally with the Spatial Planning Minister, 
whose public officers were developing a revolutionary White Paper (the Fifth National Policy Document 
on Spatial Planning (VROM, 2001)) in which they proposed spatial reservations for 'blue', 'green' and 
'red' activities. This opportunity required maps of potential retention areas. To the surprise of key 
Public Works Department officers, these were appended hastily as an annex to the new water policy 
Room for the River, presented on 29 February 2000. 
Given the still shaky legitimacy of the Public Works Department, its liberal Minister made the 
unusual move of partly decentralising the decision-making on Room for the River interventions. 
Provincial and local authorities were invited to take the lead and propose interventions, as long as the 
mandatory flood peak level reduction would be achieved. However, participation in this seemingly open 
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 Different terms were used, which created much confusion when the idea was introduced. 'Controlled flooding' and 
'retention' were considered less sensitive than 'calamity polders'. 
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 In the late 1990s, water management was given its own Vice-Minister. Previously, the Dutch Minister of Public Works 
attended to both Traffic and Water Management issues. 
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decision-making processes was strongly orchestrated and the outcomes prejudged (Van Hemert, 1999), 
which raised tension with local parties and could eventually undermine the idea of the 'calamity 
polders' itself. 
The case we explore here is that of the State Advisory Commission mandated to assess the benefits 
and suitability of emergency flood retention areas, as well as the opposition that met its advice on flood 
retention. The Commission had been instated by the Home Office and Public Works Department after 
local opposition to the flood retention areas concept that was included in the 2000 Room for the River 
policy document. The Commission was chaired by senior liberal senator Luteijn, a mentor of the Vice-
Minister. It took a restrictive policy with respect to its informants, talking to nationally and regionally 
organised interest, including a mayor, but not to local people, claiming "security is too important to 
subject it to national debate".14 A limited number of preselected 'stakeholders' were invited onto a 
consultative board (klankbordgroep) in the hope that this orchestration of 'allowed criticism' would 
reduce protests. The work of this board was not taken seriously, as evidence surfaced that the 
Commission report had already been finalised before the board could discuss the conclusions. 
The Luteijn Commission focused on securing societal support rather than asking critical questions 
about the idea of establishing flood retention areas itself. Next to giving a positive recommendation 
about establishing flood retention polders, the Commission identified three potential areas: the Ooij 
polder and Rijnstrangen area along the river Rhine and the Beersche Overlaat along the river Meuse. As 
a result of its rich history of protest of well-informed inhabitants against a variety of government plans 
and interventions, the Ooij polder became the focal point of protests against all flood retention plans. 
We therefore focus on the case of opposition in the Ooij polder. 
As uncertainty about the government plans spread among his clients, the director of the local 
branch of the Rabobank15 started an information campaign. He invited Senator Luteijn, who happened 
to be on the bank’s national Executive Board, to give a presentation during the annual meeting of the 
local Rabobank branch on 3 October 2002. The meeting room was filled with sceptical bank clients and 
members of the press. Outside the building, agriculturalists had put up straw dolls with protest slogans. 
These protest struck a chord with property owners and other citizens, several of whom had been 
involved in earlier protests against dike reinforcement and other unifying causes such as urban 
expansion of the nearby city of Nijmegen. The regional environmental conservation umbrella 
organisation, the Gelderland Environmental Federation, initially was in favour of the concept of 
uncontrolled flooding, as it would flush and regenerate the natural environment. However, this stance 
was reversed in the Ooij polder debate, when its members realised their own houses were on the line.16 
The emerging coalition against flood retention polders was not formed around an overarching idea, 
aspiring to be an anti-hegemonic coalition, which needed a shared agenda and ideological coherence to 
be successful, as Antonio Gramsci teaches in his Prison Notebooks (1935). Rather, the opponents were 
a collection of individuals with divergent agendas that entered a marriage of convenience in the new 
civic coalition 'High Water Platform' (Hoogwaterplatform), consolidating scattered protests. The local 
Rabobank provided the platform with initial funding. At the insistence of Rabobank’s director, a 
regionally well-recognised and active pensioner became chairman of the civic platform. The number of 
members and largely private sponsors increased rapidly, many of which were well-educated people 
working in education, private enterprise or administration rather than agriculture. Many originated 
from outside the Ooij polder, but felt a close connection with the polder after living there for years and, 
in some instances, decades. The platform was organised in three working groups – 'technical', 'action 
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 Interview with D. Luteijn, 6 July 2005, Nieuwegein. 
15
 The Rabobank has a long history of cooperative banking and agricultural credit provision in the Netherlands. Most farmers 
have an account with the bank and show a high degree of trust in it. Trust was boosted by the supportive role played by 
officials of the local branch office in the Ooij polder during the 1995 evacuations (see Roth et al., 2006). 
16
 Interview with R. van Loenen Martinet, 23 November 2005, Arnhem. 
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and communication' and 'legal' – and created a website presenting an overview of the latest 
developments, press comments and research reports. 
Initially, the High Water Platform tried to enter into dialogue with the Ministry of Transport and 
Water Management and its Vice-Minister. However, its chairman soon concluded that this was not 
paying off, shifting the platform’s target to the House of Representatives. Platform members fostered a 
network of relationships with representatives from several political parties, feeding it with customised 
information. 
The genius of the chair of the coalition was to start an information 'guerrilla warfare' against flood 
retention whilst avoiding NIMBY-ism 17  (Roth et al., 2006). The platform teamed up with river 
engineering and hydrological experts, who could devise alternatives and ask critical questions about the 
assumptions on river discharge, the cost-benefit ratio and climate-change projections used in the 
debate on flood retention polders. The platform shared the opinions of these credible experts with 
policymakers and politicians to support the case against flood retention. While the High Water 
Platform’s legal workgroup obtained a critical consultancy report withheld by the Water Department, 
the technical workgroup gathered information to challenge the economic and engineering assumptions 
of the Luteijn Commission’s proposals for flood retention polders. Undermining the scientific 
legitimisation of flood retention polders was a smart move, as supporters had so far ignored the 
uncertainties associated with the scientific material presented. 
There is strong evidence of venue shopping (cf. Baumgartner and Jones, 1993). Coming from 
different backgrounds, coalition members could access multiple venues such as the national press, 
Parliament, the Council of State (administrative judiciary), municipalities and the province. While 
coalition members guided politicians around in the area, the Mayor of Ubbergen and Beek, the main 
population centre of the Ooij polder, steered his own course and went via the national media. Through 
the contacts of the Province of Gelderland, platform members sought cross-border cooperation with 
the German state of Nordrhein-Westfalen, where similar policy measures were debated, and which was 
sensitive to the Dutch plans because of the trans-boundary character of the effects of using the Ooij 
polder for flood retention. The townspeople initially argued that they were willing to do their bit for 
national safety by agreeing to a flood retention Ooij polder. However, as coalition members fed them 
with counter-expertise, they found the case for flooding becoming progressively weaker.18 Property 
owners joined the Chamber of Commerce, social partners and homeowners in demanding counter-
expertise from the same institute that had put flood retention on the map: WL Delft Hydraulics. 
Notwithstanding the huge amount of time, energy and money put into pushing the plan for flood 
retention polders, in 2005 the Vice-Minister abandoned the idea (WaterForum, 2005). It had been 
brought down by a combination of factors including the expert criticism of the technical assumptions 
behind the plan, the withheld cost-benefit analysis and the pressure put on the national political arena 
by the many activities of the High Water Platform. 
Figure 4 summarises the chronological narrative of Dutch water policy change above, highlighting 
the actions of central individuals on which the discussion section builds. The figure focuses on the 
actions of and interaction between actors in the national water authority’s network and the local 
citizens’ High Water Platform coalition. 
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 NIMBY stands for Not In My BackYard. 
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 Interview with H.B.A.M. Sanders, 30 June 2005, Kekerdom. The High Water Platform attracted water experts who cast 
doubts on, among others, the accuracy of the Ministry’s climate scenarios, the degree of flood-level reduction realised by the 
intervention and the cost-benefit ratio. 
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Figure 4. Main actions and interactions between central actors in the national government and the 
regional coalition in the Netherlands. 
Time/context Actions of individuals in the network of 
water authority & water experts 
(National) 
Policy 
interaction 
Actions of individuals in the local 
coalition of citizens (High Water 
Platform Ooij) 
1980s Network: after opposition to a technocratic 
water management approach, a few civil 
servants of Public Works Department engage 
with national nature protection NGOs and the 
Ministry of Agriculture. Together they design 
'green rivers' for major rivers 
 Individuals participate in protests against dike 
reinforcement, favouring nature development 
(local) 
1990s. Integrated 
water management 
increasingly 
recognised 
Individual water experts advocate flood 
retention. Individual civil servants start to 
advocate the new policy concept 'living with 
rivers' within the Ministry responsible for water 
  
1995/98. Near floods Advocates of the 'living with rivers' concept 
reframe their ideas to fit in with the recurred 
popularity of dike revetment 
 Ooij polder evacuated. Individuals build trust 
in the region by giving support in evacuation. 
Population divided about dike reinforcement 
1999/2000 Civil servants advocate the policy idea Room for 
the River and use a window of opportunity to 
connect spatial policy and water policy. New 
idea of structural reservations for flood 
retention in annex water policy 
  
2001 New venue: Luteijn Commission, between 
politics and water experts 
  
2002 Provinces & 
municipalities protest 
Luteijn presents policy idea in the 
region 
Idea conflicts Business leader uses network to invite 
Luteijn Commission to present in the 
region 
2002/2003 
Elections. Protests 
alarm national 
politics 
Replacement of the Vice-Minister of 
Water 
Individual water 
experts offer 
counter-
expertise 
Organised opposition in the region. 
Build coalition. Challenge 
appropriateness of flood retention. 
Coalition members lobby in media, 
internet & own networks. Coalition 
members strengthen network with 
(inter-)national water experts, 
municipalities & the private sector 
2004/2005 New Vice-Minister drops spatial reservation for 
flood retention 
 Platform remains active in scanning policy 
plans and providing information 
DISCUSSION – STRATEGIES USED BY SUPPORTERS AND OPPONENTS 
This section discusses the strategies used by central individuals among the supporters and opponents of 
water policy change. Firstly, the chronological case descriptions in the previous sections are synthesised 
according to the fivefold distinction of strategies of individuals in Huitema and Meijerink (2009). 
Secondly, we reflect on the complementary roles of key individuals. 
Developing and challenging ideas 
In both cases, the transition idea started with discussions between mid-ranking civil servants from a 
department responsible for water safety, scientists from national water research institutes and people 
from nature conservation organisations. It is hard to pinpoint the origin of the new idea, as many 
worked on green engineering and 'living rivers' (e.g. Fokkens, 2001; Wolters et al., 2001; Huitema and 
Meijerink, 2009). It is, however, possible to pinpoint a small number of supporters in the national 
government who pushed the idea over a period of several elections, background studies and (near) 
flood events. In Hungary, at first, the idea was treated as rather technical, aiming at safety and nature 
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protection. After opposition from regional parties, regional interests and the more integral concept of 
floodplain management were embraced. The objectives of water management broadened from (flood) 
safety to include nature conservation and rural development. The adoption and implementation of this 
broadened concept was influenced strongly by a regional coalition, which developed its own ideas, 
separately from the national government. This coalition was supported by European funds and inspired 
by (inter-)national scholars. It is important to note that civil servants and their technical experts framed 
their new policy differently from the regional coalition in Hungary. Whereas civil servants described it 
as an effective response to new challenges in water management, coalition members stressed that it 
had its roots in history and tradition, and opposed prevailing water management. 
In the Netherlands, the idea remained more confined to flood safety. After the near-floods of the 
1990s, 'nature development' gave way to security as the primary focus. In the Ooij polder, a strong 
coalition against the regional implementation of the new water policy, and in particular the idea of 
flood retention polders, emerged. The government did not enter into dialogue with this coalition, nor 
did the coalition develop well-defined alternatives. In contrast with the Hungarian case, the opponents 
chose not to focus their protests on the consequences of the plan but rather on its assumptions and 
scientific underpinning. The supporters of the new idea were vulnerable to these attacks, as they had 
neglected being explicit about and validating underlying assumptions and uncertainties, using analysis 
primarily in an 'advocacy' mode, in other words to justify and elaborate their position on the policy 
issue of flood safety. In Hungary, opponents challenged the sustainability and legitimacy of the new 
idea, pointing to its strongly technical approach and referring to the problems that technical solutions 
in water management had caused so far. In both cases, opponents highlighted the unwanted (future) 
situation that the new idea would create. 
Building coalitions for selling ideas 
Following Huitema and Meijerink (2009), we define coalitions as groups of actors from more than one 
organisation with shared beliefs and explicit agreements on how to use resources to achieve common 
goals. In both regions, one person or a small group of people initiated a new coalition. Although these 
coalitions soon became associated with supporting or opposing a new idea, the members before 
entering these coalitions did not have a strong preference for a particular policy idea in water 
management, nor did they share core beliefs.19 The coalitions were initiated by an individual that 
managed to link different core beliefs to a particular policy idea. The leader of the Bokartisz coalition in 
Hungary sold his idea explicitly as one that could serve regional development, nature protection, flood 
safety and drought control at the same time, in which case actors could join the coalition independently 
of their core belief. Although successful in its cooperation with the national government, this may have 
threatened the stability of the Hungarian coalition. Some time later, partners left the coalition and 
active members remained mostly confined to those that see floodplain revitalisation as the only 
appropriate regional solution for sustainable rural development and nature conservation, reducing the 
fragmentation of beliefs (cf. Sabatier, 1988). Within the existing coalitions and actor networks of the 
Netherlands and Hungary, individuals did not significantly change their policy objectives and main 
policy idea (cf. Sabatier, 1988); rather, they took turns in supporting or opposing policy (change), 
depending on the policy objective. 
In both cases, the coalition entered the opposition after a meeting in the region, where a national 
figurehead of the water policy presented the state’s new policy idea. The initiator of the coalition 
hosted this meeting and invited the figurehead through personal and historically grown networks. In 
the Netherlands, for example, the Commission chairman was on the Board of Directors of the Rabobank 
and was invited to speak by the director of its well-established local subsidiary. After debating the 
implications of the plan in the region, opposition started to grow, with the new coalition taking a key 
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 A set of basic values, causal assumptions and problem perceptions (Sabatier, 1988). 
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role. Interestingly, core members of the Hungarian and Dutch regional coalitions used the same words 
to describe the moment when the national government’s policy idea was presented in the region: "it 
was a great shock to see the plan (…)".20 This supports the impression that actors in the region at the 
time were not well-informed about the government’s new policy ideas and had not yet formulated 
their critique or organised their opposition. 
In effect, building coalitions and pooling resources under a common position was a crucial strategy 
for individuals in developing their own ideas as much as in opposing ideas of others. Our cases suggest 
this was particularly true for actors outside the national government. Whether national government 
actors had stronger networks to rely on, whether affiliation blocks coalition building or whether the 
Dutch 'state commissions', which became common for launching new ideas, were effectively the state-
equivalent of coalition building needs further attention. 
Recognising and exploiting windows of opportunity 
In both cases, there were debates about new policy ideas in water management. The government 
commissioned studies and hosted working groups, after which various drivers of policy change were 
identified. Especially in Hungary, keen to enter the EU, European Directives, funding and accession 
negotiations favoured a shift towards participatory and integral planning, ecological concerns and the 
reduction of cropland. Although in both cases (near) floods and the growing recognition of climate risks 
carried the debate on the appropriateness of prevailing water management, their impact on the debate 
was different. In the Netherlands, supporters of both old and new water management paradigms stuck 
to their positions and secured the interventions that they had advocated for some time. As a result, the 
national government endorsed dike improvements and floodplain restoration alongside flood retention 
polders in the Room for the River policy. In Hungary, the supporters of water retention managed to gain 
funds and policy support to change prevailing water management practices. In both cases, the regional 
coalition was more active in mobilising people than in exploiting windows of opportunity. The 
exploitation of strategic opportunities seemed to be more confined to individuals in the administration 
in close proximity to the political arena. In Hungary, a key player at the Ministry of Environment and 
Water exploited the momentum for change created by national elections that brought to power a new 
coalition determined to prove itself different from the previous government. 
More generally, our cases confirmed that elections and the changing of governing parties forced 
existing networks of civil servants and politicians to reconfigure, and could offer a window of 
opportunity to establish a new idea and kick-off a transition. However, elections after a new idea had 
started to take-off could also disrupt the fresh networks. In Hungary, key figures in the central 
administration withdrew or were replaced after the 2006 budget cuts and elections, while 'old-school' 
water engineers from before the transition returned to their positions. This changed the course of the 
water policy to more conventional solutions and frustrated many actors that believed in more 
fundamental changes in water management practice. 
Using multiple venues 
The previous subsections looked at the origins of the new ideas, the coalitions that were built to sell 
them and the opportunities for introducing new ideas into the water policy at a particular moment in 
time. Here, we ask whether individuals or groups of individuals sought out alternative venues to 
promote new ideas. We understand venues as the possible places where policy issues can be debated 
including various levels of government, the forums of scientists and legislatures, and the media 
(Baumgartner and Jones, 2002). We focus on the choice of venue of the individuals identified in 
previous sections – the central actors at the ministry responsible for water policy and in the new 
regional coalitions. 
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 Interview: 29 August 2007, Budapest; and 14 October 2005, by telephone in the Netherlands. 
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Both opponents and supporters of the new policy ideas actively created and used new venues 
including the national press, internet, Parliament, the Council of State (administrative judiciary) and 
cooperation with neighbouring countries. In the Netherlands, to boost the legitimacy of the new water 
policy Room for the River, the liberal Minister took the new initiative to partially decentralise decision-
making on the implementation of the policy, using provincial and local authorities as a new venue. With 
varying degrees of success and sincerity in applying these new ideas, several Room for the River 
projects are now ongoing. In the Ooij polder, participation was largely orchestrated and regional 
protests sidestepped when a State Commission was instated to investigate the cost and benefits of the 
new policy idea of flood retention. With the creation of this new venue the national government aimed 
to strengthen the legitimacy of its policy idea. Failing to connect to local parties, the Commission 
triggered strong opposition, which itself successfully exploited new venues such as the media, political 
party meetings, the chamber of commerce and Parliament. In Hungary too, the national government 
met opposition from local authorities, civil organisations and national park authorities. In this case, 
however, a regional coalition and local authorities took the initiative to offer a location for water 
retention under their own conditions. The national government representative responded by initiating 
new venues for more participatory policy planning and trans-disciplinary background research. 
In sum, actors from the new regional coalition stood out in using the media including the internet, 
issuing (public) communications to politicians and legal action. Governmental actors used 
organisational and financial instruments such as allocating, blocking or diverting funds and changing 
budget priorities to block or support the implementation of a new policy idea. 
Orchestrating and managing networks 
Turning to the last of the five strategies, this subsection discusses how actors cooperated, what 
networks played a role in the transition in water policy and whether (groups of) individuals actively 
influenced the operation of networks. In particular, this subsection asks whether individuals influenced 
the development of water policy by breaking up or providing alternative policy networks. 
Water management in both Hungary and the Netherlands had been dominated by a strong network 
of water authority civil servants (for policy support), engineers at national research institutes (for 
technical underpinning) and the private sector (consultants, civil engineers and agriculturists). The idea 
of water retention and flood retention polders was established by a network of mid-ranking civil 
servants from a department responsible for water safety, experts from national research institutes and 
people from nature conservation organisations. Civil servants are strategic in exploiting their relations 
with politicians. For example, in the Dutch case, civil servants overruled politicians and exploited the 
good connections between the Ministers of Water, Spatial Planning and Agriculture. Conspicuous 
orchestration can also challenge the legitimacy of a network. In the Netherlands, for instance, the 
Luteijn Commission was criticised for orchestrating a consultation board, consisting of pre-selected 
stakeholders. 
The leaders of the opposing coalitions also proved successful networkers, inasmuch that they used 
multiple affiliations to extend their network. In the Netherlands, for example, members of the opposing 
coalition lobbied their business networks through the Chamber of Commerce, and national and regional 
politicians through their membership of different political parties. To challenge the technical basis of 
new ideas, opponents connected to specialists operating in the background (civil engineers, ecologists, 
hydrologists, lawyers). In particular, the coalition hooked up with researchers in the national water 
institutes to gain counter-expertise, which led to the leaking of a critical report on the costs and 
rationality of flood retention in the Netherlands. Opponents also exploited trans-boundary networks. 
The Dutch coalition consulted stakeholders, civil society action platforms and local authorities in 
Germany, while in Hungary, opponents participated in internationally funded research and 
development projects with (inter-)national scientists and civil society groups. 
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Complementary strategies 
Next to the strategies discussed above, we identified in our cases five roles of key individuals that 
deserve special attention: 1) translating the idea, 2) engaging with opponents, 3) managing information 
(cf. Olsson et al., 2004), 4) managing time (cf. Holling, 2004), and 5) managing spatial scales (cf. Born 
and Purcell, 2006). 
An important role that individuals played was 'contextualising the idea'; in both cases, we observed 
people who contextualised the new idea for regional use or implementation. These individuals acted 
similar to Litfin’s (1995) knowledge brokers, but were not confined to the science policy interface – they 
were found among supporters as well as opponents. As supporters, they contextualised the plans of the 
national government and attached regional objectives and benefits to it. Among opponents they were 
found to transform the plan, which the national government promoted, into an idea with negative 
consequences for the region. Both in the Hungarian and Dutch cases, local people did not initially show 
a great deal of interest in the plans of the national government. In the Ooij polder, the inhabitants 
initially thought that the national government would not carry through its plans for water retention. 
Opposition started with an informed and trusted individual from the region, who brought home the 
message together with his critique of the plan, fuelling regional concern and, eventually, opposition. 
In Hungary, national government actors successfully employed a strategy of engaging with 
opponents, managing expectations and, more specifically, engaging with individuals that contextualised 
ideas in the region between 2002 and 2003. They invited an opposing regional coalition to join the 
implementation planning process and bring in its ideas. In this case, the national government was able 
to realise its own policy ideas alongside some of those posited by the opposition. In the Ooij polder case, 
there was little engagement with opponents. The opposing Hoogwaterplatform attempted to engage 
directly with the responsible Vice-Minister. However, these attempts were abandoned after the 
opponents concluded that their arguments were not being paid serious attention to and a dialogue was 
impossible. Working in networks and engaging with opponents, the question had to be asked whether 
partners should compromise and change their objectives21 or whether objectives were effectively 
combined and would have to be implemented alongside each other. In Hungary, neither the idea of a 
retention reservoir nor the capacity of the reservoir changed in the negotiations, so the national 
government got what it wanted from the start, whereas regional partners settled for a compromise. 
Engaging with opponents included the challenge to cope with individuals of the old paradigm. As a 
member of the Hungarian regional coalition pointed out: 
A paradigm change makes a lot of losers – all people whose life is built on intensive large-scale agriculture, 
all those who were water engineers for decades and learned that water has to go down as quickly as it can 
and that flood is an enemy. It is not easy to change for a person and to say 'what I said before was wrong', 
and to include new ideas. Very few people can do that. I am open to older people, but I know that as 
people get older it becomes even harder. 
The role of managing (scientific) information and knowledge reports has a short lifespan in the 
administration, as people are replaced and reports get lost. A great deal depends on individuals and 
networks to keep (especially new) information alive. In both countries, researchers used the transition 
to secure significant research funds. With the protests and new policy ideas of the Hungarian coalition, 
research in Hungary was more trans-disciplinary than in the Netherlands. Yet in Hungary, distribution of 
the reports produced during the transition period to other ministries and parties was poor. Supporters 
of hard engineering (dry polders and dikes) did not trust the hydrologic or economic feasibility of 
floodplain management to reduce extreme flood levels. In the Netherlands, participation and decision-
                                                          
21
 Or, as Sabatier (1988) hypothesises: when change in a governmental action programme cannot be restricted to secondary 
aspects, adherents will seek to modify the policy core in the following sequence: first, add a portion of the opposing coalition’s 
core; second, delete a portion of the existing core; third, arrange a synthesis of the two cores; and, finally, acquiesce to a 
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making were more strongly orchestrated and limited to the network of water authorities and support 
research institutes. Research stayed confined to the familiar water research institutes. The Dutch 
institutes used the additional funding to attract experts from other disciplines and to become more 
interdisciplinary. Possibly as a result, information was more carefully managed in the Netherlands and 
new insights became better established throughout the government. At the same time, in the Dutch 
case, a background study report was withheld and only retrieved by the opposing regional coalition 
after threatening legal action. This incident itself became a weapon in the struggle for image, trust and 
legitimacy. Related to information management are the activities of both proponents and opponents to 
sidestep the good governance principles of transparency and accountability. 
In terms of time management, parties used time differently. Regional coalitions were dependent on 
quick success to keep their coalition alive. The regional coalition in Hungary blamed the national 
government for selective implementation of the policy plans. In both cases election times guided 
politicians. Civil servants and scientists, on the other hand, could wait longer for the right time (and 
budget) to arrive. Civil organisations and coalitions had more autonomy in selecting a next generation 
of leaders, and were thereby less subjected to sudden changes of policy and ideology. 
In managing spatial scales, national governments framed policy options as localised solutions for a 
national problem. Regional coalitions highlighted landscape and regional aspects and challenged the 
fairness of having to solve (suffer for) other people’s problems. In the Ooij polder case, spatial-
administrative scales played a key role. Flooding of the river Rhine was a trans-boundary problem, but 
the proposed solution was primarily a national issue, not taking heed of the impact of upstream 
conditions and policies nor of the sensitivities associated with the idea of flood retention polders. While 
the supporters created tension and unrest by underestimating this factor in the relationships with 
Germany, the opponents made optimal use of it in networking, coalition building, the research agenda 
and communication. 
CONCLUSIONS 
This paper aimed to examine the significance of individuals in supporting or opposing major water 
policy change, by analysing what happened in Hungary and the Netherlands when water retention and 
floodplain rehabilitation were introduced into water management to replace or complement flood 
levees and drainage. 
When the new ideas (water retention, floodplain revitalisation, flood retention polder) emerged, 
people took turns in supporting or opposing policy (change), depending on the governing policy 
objective. In doing so, both supporters and opponents used the strategies identified in Huitema and 
Meijerink (2009): to develop ideas, to build coalitions to sell ideas, to use windows of opportunity, to 
play multiple venues and to orchestrate networks. Working together in coalitions, key members took 
complementary roles. With respect to the development of policy ideas, we observed two different 
opposition strategies: 1) discredit the new policy idea to block change and maintain the status quo, and 
2) advocate change towards another policy idea. In both cases, opponents were successful in engaging 
with experts from the scientific community (aligned with the supporters) to challenge the legitimacy of 
(assumptions underlying) the new policy idea. Additional strategies that opponents pursued included 
changing budget priorities and timelines. 
By selecting and describing two cases with a visible opposition to new water policy, we inevitably 
introduced a bias in our analysis. Areas for future research include looking at strategies and the 
interaction of opponents and supporters in relation to stages of major policy change; addressing what 
conclusions are specific for transitional policy change or for better understanding transition dynamics in 
general; and reflecting on the effect of the strategies of supporters and opponents on the outcome of 
major policy change in the context of other variables such as the role of ideologies, interests, 
institutions and path dependency. 
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Our cases evidenced the key roles of individuals and suggested that these roles become particularly 
prominent in the interaction between supporters and opponents of (parts of) major water policy 
change. A central difference between the Dutch and the Hungarian case analysed in this paper was that 
in the Netherlands a regional coalition blocked the implementation of an element (flood retention 
polders) of the national government’s policy idea (Room for the River), whereas in Hungary cooperation 
with key opponents of the plan in the region allowed the national government to realise its objectives 
alongside recognising those of the opponents. The cases suggested that the choice of whether or not to 
engage with (potential) opponents influences the outcome of water policy change. A special role was 
that of individuals, who translated emerging water policy ideas to other actors. In the cases we 
analysed, each influential coalition had such an individual at its base. These individuals were also found 
to be successful networkers and creative in exploiting new venues. Whether or not government actors 
sought to involve these individuals in policy making influenced the realisation of the water policy. In the 
Dutch case, where this was omitted, the coalition could obstruct the new elements of the water policy. 
By engaging with opponents, negotiated solutions could give water policy change a new impetus, yet at 
the same time steer away from the original idea, alienating supporters that measured success by the 
realisation of the original idea. 
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